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Abstract 
Innovation undoubtedly plays a crucial role in creating and developing of market share, revenue, growth and profit at an 
organizational level. Innovation strategy is considered to be one of the key elements of corporate strategies since it determines 
where, when and what type of innovation is needed to be implemented. In this manner, common approach tells the business 
leaders to listen to their customer base and direct investments in products which target desired profit margin. However, this 
approach ignores the emergence of disruptive forces and eventually, will cause the demise of the companies. The major focus of 
this study is to investigate the determining factors of embracing disruptive innovation by an incumbent, through setting up an 
example from the Airline Industry in Turkey. Furthermore, by doing so, the study’s goal is to reveal the power of disruptive 
forces and investigating the rapid response given by an industry leader.  In this study, qualitative case study methodology is 
selected since the research question is contemporary in character and the process is continual.  
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1. Introduction 
Disruptive innovation theory is based on the fact that the reasons that contribute to a firm’s success can also play 
a significant role in its failure. The concept of disruptive innovation explains the failure of the established companies 
when they encounter certain changes in the market. When technology and market experience a change, established 
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companies are always well-ahead of their industries in leading both incremental and radical innovations that address 
the future needs of their existing customers. However, the same companies fail in the introduction of new 
technologies that do not meet their customer’s need (Christensen, 1997). These technological changes originally 
took place in small and emerging markets. They typically offer different features that are not valued by the current 
customers of the established companies. The common characteristics of disruptive technologies are to be cheaper, 
simpler, smaller and providing ease of use (Danneels, 2004). However, the performance attributes of the new 
technology continues to improve and eventually invades the established markets (Christensen & Bower, 1996).  
Defining innovation as either incremental or radical is the prevailing way in classification of innovation 
activities. Nevertheless, Christensen and Raynor (2003) argue that these kinds of innovations maintain the same 
character. The underlying reason for the failure of the established companies revolves around three main factors; the 
methodological difference in the pursuit of sustaining and disruptive technologies, the technological progress grows 
at a faster rate than what the market demands and last but not least the revenue and cost structure of established 
companies which target attractive profit margins and rapid growth opportunities.  
Disruptive innovation involves products, services or approaches that transform existing markets or create new 
ones by trading off raw performance for the sake of simplicity, convenience, affordability and accessibility. The 
main objective of disruptive innovation is not to bring the best performance, product or service to current customers 
but, it is to bring lower performance products or services to market by the introduction of other benefits. Disruptive 
innovation theory is based on initial low-cost model but at the same time with lower performance features (Yu & 
Hang, 2009). 
Within the framework of disruptive innovation, this study focuses on the implementation of low-cost business 
model via an established company in Turkey. In this context, the study first begins by a literature review of the early 
studies on discontinuous changes regarding the failure of established companies, various understandings of 
disruptive innovation and the ways to respond to disruptive innovation. Then, an in-depth case study of how and 
why Turkish Airlines arrived at the decision to respond to disruptive innovation which emerged in Turkish aviation 
industry after 1983 is reported. The results and possible future consequences of the case are also discussed.  
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Discontinuous Changes regarding the Failure of Established Companies 
Technological discontinuity determines a new set of rules in a given industry or creates entirely new ones. It 
received particular attention because it explains the effects of discontinuous changes and innovations on 
organizations, industries and competitive environment before the emergence of Disruptive Innovation Theory. It is 
suggested that the periods of incremental changes are interrupted by discontinuous changes which are divided into 
two categories as competence-enhancing and competence-destroying changes. Competence enhancing innovations 
are built on company’s existing knowledge and strengthened the position of established companies, whereas a 
competence destroying innovation makes current know-how obsolete and is generally initiated by new firms and is 
faced with great resistance by established companies (Tushman & Anderson, 1986).  
Later on, Henderson & Clark (1990) investigated the reason as to why some incumbents fail to develop 
something as that is seen as straightforward. Consequently, architectural innovation forces the introduction of the 
knowledge of the linkage between components. In this type of innovation, understanding of the component remains 
the same while the linkage of components is subject to change. The companies which ignore the architectural 
knowledge simply failed in spite of being competent in component technologies.  
However, all sustaining technological changes conduct the companies to increase the rate of performance 
improvement along with the customer’s expectation. Sustaining technologies seek improved performance at the 
same time, satisfy the needs of mainstream customers in the existing market (Christensen & Bower, 1996) On the 
other hand, Adner (2002) explained that as technology improves and consumer requirements are met and, surpassed, 
consumer’s willingness to pay for each improvement decreases and disruptive technologies start to capture those 
same consumers. The core of disruptive technology is to change the performance metrics along which firms 
compete (Danneels, 2004). Since disruptive technologies introduce different product features that were of no or little 
value before, they therefore change the basis for competition. Disruption occurs when the performance trajectories 
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of disruptive technology intersect with that of the performance in the mainstream market (Christensen & Raynor 
2003). 
2.2. Various Understandings of Disruptive Innovation 
Disruptive innovation introduces a very different value proposition into the market. Disruptive technologies may 
underperformed in the mainstream market with the existing products. However, they have other attributes which are 
valued generally by new customers. (Christensen & Raynor 2003). When disruptive technologies emerge, many 
leading firms that have been successful in excelling at sustaining innovation, found themselves on the threshold of a 
new and harsh competition with which they were unfamiliar. Markides (1997) who introduced strategic innovation 
approach to the literature, found that the companies succeeded to a great extent in some industries, however, it was 
done without the help of radical technological innovation.  The success was termed as strategic innovation that 
allowed companies to change the rules of the game in which they were involved. They were successful not because 
they played the game better than their competitors, but because they identified the gaps in the industry, which they 
filled and turned into a new mass market. As stated by Markides & Geroski (2005) disruptive technological 
innovations are the examples of simply transforming a niche market into a mass market process. This process 
provides the opportunity for the new entrants that invade the market and offer the product from the niche market to 
the mass market.   
Schmidt & Druehl (2008) suggested a complementary framework and used the term “encroachment” to define a 
situation where a new product takes away sales from an existing one. Low-end encroachment is explained in a way 
when a new product first displaces the existing one in the lower-end of the old products market and then penetrates 
upward. On the other hand, high-end encroachment starts at the high-end of the old product’s market.  In the low-
end market, customers are least willing to pay, whereas high-end market’s customers are the most willing. High-end 
encroachment is consistent with sustaining innovation activity in opposition to low-end encroachment. It is outlined 
that both new market disruption and low- end disruption, as they are defined by Christensen, result in the patterns 
suitable to low-end encroachment diffusion process. The new product takes away sales from the old product either 
immediately which refers to low-end disruption or after opening up a new market which refers to new-market 
disruption. Low-end encroachment theory is consistent with Disruptive Innovation Theory in terms of describing the 
alternate means of this phenomenon.  
On the other hand, Tellis (2006) puts forward visionary leadership as a key determinant to a firms’ survival, 
success and growth instead of external technological forces. Visionary leaders are the leaders who focus on the 
future potential at the expense of cannibalizing their current assets. Success and failure are the results of internal 
cultural aspects of a firm. For instance such factors as leadership effectiveness and ethicality (Elçi, Şener, Aksoy, & 
Alpkan, 2012), corporate entrepreneurial climate (Bulut, Ç. & Alpkan, L., 2006; Ergun, E., Bulut Ç., Alpkan, L. & 
Demircan, N.,2004), innovation based strategic planning approaches (Eren, E., Aren, S. & Alpkan, L., 2000) etc. 
contribute to improved employee loyalty and innovative performance.  
Tellis’s view contradicts the technological evolution flows which is a distinct pattern and presents its 
manifestations as S-Curves. Tellis (2006) suggests that technology follows a multistep process which randomly 
progresses that is preceded by long periods of dormancy. The path of technological change is very difficult to 
predict. On the other hand, he found that although technology was based on inferior performance as a primary 
features, it could be superior in other ways. However, he stated that the latter characteristics may not be impacted by 
price, size, convenience or simplicity as stated by Disruptive Innovation Theory. 
Tripsas & Gavetti (2000) investigated the adaptation of established firms to radical technological changes from 
different points of view. They found that managerial cognition influenced the development of capabilities either 
through restricting or directing technology development activities and ultimately affecting the organizational 
adaptation within the firms. Again consistent with Christensen’s original definition of, Govindarajan & Kopalle 
(2006) call attention to disruptive innovation which introduces a different set of features and performance compared 
to existing products that is offered at lower price. They put the emphasis on lower-margin where price is concerned.  
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2.3. The Path of Response to Disruptive Innovation 
Henderson (2006) argued that organizational competence can be central in explaining the failure of established 
companies in order to catch up with disruptive innovation. The key to understanding and explaining the difficulty in 
responding to disruptive innovation is embedded in organizational core competences which may be evaluated also 
as core rigidities. Existing routines for providing satisficing solutions to present customers prevent organizations 
from initiating changes (Tsai, 2006). Reconstruction of an organization in order to take advantage of new 
opportunities and investment in disruptive innovation are extremely difficult and require major behavioral changes 
(Danneels 2002). Many companies find these efforts irrational and continue to search for opportunities within their 
existing market (Henderson 2006). 
Disruptive moves of new players change the status quo by attacking the rules of the game set by the established 
firms, and force the latter to admit the necessity of trying to respond to this attack.  Charitou & Markides (2003) 
stated that a response to disruptive innovation could vary from industry to industry or from market to market and 
determined five ways to respond. The first response suggests to concentrate on the traditional business. The main 
idea behind this response is that a new way of doing business would not necessarily capture the whole market. 
Therefore, improving value proposition for the already targeted market could be the best way to respond to 
disruptive innovation. The second way to respond is to ignore the disruptive innovation since it has a different value 
proposition and targets different customer segments. This response represents an understanding that underestimates 
the threats that may be associated with this disruption. The third response proposes to exchange roles in order to 
disrupt the disruptor through playing a totally different game. This response emphasizes still different product 
attributes than those of the disruptor. The fourth way of responding is to embrace and scale up only the disruption 
at the expense of the old way of doing business. In this strategic choice the original disruptor is not disrupted by a 
new type of counter disruption but face a challenge of intensified competition in its new market. The fifth response 
is to adopt the disruption while at the same time trying to keep the traditional business as is. This response 
necessitates to hold two conflicting or seemingly conflicting positions, simultaneously. In this context, setting a 
separate organizational unit that is autonomous is a common approach.  
As a derivative of the fifth way of responding, a totally autonomous strategic unit can be established to cope with 
the disruption while the existing organization continues its own traditional way. Christensen & Raynor (2003) 
suggest that the establishment of a spin-off is necessary when the revenue and cost structure of the mainstream 
organization are different from the new one. On the other hand, Porter (1996) had earlier argued that operating in the 
same market with two different (or even conflicting) strategies is not feasible because strategic positioning requires 
trade-offs in order not to be stuck in the middle. Otherwise, companies can find themselves incurring huge 
straddling costs that may result in diminishment of the value of their current structure. 
The main question as to whether this is achievable in order to manage the incompatible activities within the 
established companies was attempted to be answered by different scholars. Markides & Charitou (2004), in their 
study with regards to competing with dual (or combined) strategy, found that competition in two opposing strategic 
positions within the same industry is possible even in the absence of a separate division (ambidexterity). In order to 
manage seemingly conflicting positions or options, the discovery of complementarity within duality is a must 
(Şanal, Alpkan, Aren, Sezen & Ayden, 2013; Alpkan & Aren, 2009). The main concern must be to be able to 
concentrate at the same time on different dimensions of a product or service feature which in turn, attract different 
customer needs, Then, it is crucial to determine the conflicts between two businesses and how they strategically are 
similar to one another, once this is done, separation can be an option. However, it is also found that separate division 
does not necessarily secure or guarantee success especially when mechanistic and rigid structures and routines of the 
traditional way of doing business are replicated. The key to success is to be able to launch the new business model in 
a creative manner. 
3. Methodology 
This study investigates how and why an established company operating in the Turkish Air Transportation 
Industry responded to a disruptive innovation done by a newcomer. It also attempts to reveal the factors behind the 
decision to embrace a new business model. This investigation is done through qualitative case study methodology 
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since it is the most suitable method to explore “how” and “why” types of questions especially when the process is 
long. On the other hand, a case study is able to reflect the complexities and the richness of the phenomenon (Baxter 
& Jack 2008). 
A combination of public data, company reports, related literature and interview data were collected in connection 
with both Turkish Air Transportation Industry and other players in the market. This research includes in-depth 
interviews with top managers of Turkish Airlines and its sub-brand, Anadolu Jet. The interviews were comprised of 
open-ended questions, but based on specific set of inquiries attempting to explain strategic steps during the process 
of responding to a disruptive innovation by new competitors. In order to ensure the accuracy of the collected 
information from the interviews, secondary data such as annual reports, related web sites, and media articles were 
also scanned.  On the other hand, even though the scope of this study is limited to the domestic market, the data 
regarding to the total airline market was included where necessary because of the market evaluation in order to give 
the reader a more comprehensive outlook. 
The air transportation industry was studied since it possesses the characteristic of disruption in both a low-end 
and new market creation approach of disruptive innovation theory. In addition, by taking a long term historical 
perspective, this study gives also some insights into the evolutionary process of strategic transformation of an 
important business sector in an emerging economy after deregulations.  
4. Findings 
4.1 Emergence of Low-Cost Carriers 
Airline industry is one the most important and the fastest growing business sectors in the world. Increasing 
globalization, urbanization and increase in income level make air transportation one of the largest industries in the 
world, by reaching turnover of $ 708 billion in 2013 (IATA, 2014). Today, the global airline industry garners around 
32 million commercial flights a year transporting 3 billion passengers (ICAO, 2013). With a new business model 
structure which focuses only on transportation activities and with the removal of other additional services, low cost 
carriers (LCCs) play a significant role in stimulating air transportation demand throughout the world. The primary 
benefit of low-cost carriers is the lower prices compared to the full service carriers and therefore is considered as 
hybrid disruption in characteristic. It carries both the characteristic of low end and new market disruption due to its 
targeting of both the incumbent’s airlines passenger and non-airline passengers. After the deregulation of the 
domestic air transportation market in many countries in line with liberalization, LCCs have taken advantage of this 
new opportunity and have offered innovative services and created new demand in air transportation market. They 
operate with a generic strategy of cost leadership and the utilization of point-to-point structure, the use of secondary 
airports, which provides minimum service while maximizing seat capacity (Barrett 2004).  
In Turkey, before the policies of deregulation beginning with early 1980s, the only player in the market was 
Turkish Airlines which is owned by the state and which served both domestic and international needs. Although the 
first deregulation effort was not sufficient in 1983, a second wave of deregulation took place in 2003 and a fully 
liberalized market trend began to manifest itself as part of the public policy. Airport rates and taxes were reduced, 
additional taxes were abolished and new market entries were encouraged by the Ministry of Transportation. As a 
result of all these ameliorations, many new players entered the air transportation sector (Nergiz, 2008).  
Turkish aviation industry has experienced one of the highest growth rates in the world over the past decade, this 
being the direct impact of deregulation which occurred in 2003. The market experienced a sudden increase in 
domestic airline passenger traffic by 58.1% in 2004, in comparison to the previous year (DHMI, 2004). In 2013, the 
total number of passengers amounted to 149,995,868 while it was just 10,745,444 in 2003. Domestic passenger 
traffic also increased 11.7 % in 2013, compared to 2012, reaching 76,148,526 passengers (TOBB, 2013) 
4.2 The Response to Low-Cost Carriers by Turkish Airlines 
When the deregulation took place in the Turkish Air Transportation industry, new entrepreneurs were given the 
opportunity to operate in the domestic market in which only one airline was operating previously. Various 
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companies have since positioned themselves so that they could capture a portion of market share in this rapidly 
growing industry.  After the second deregulation, numerous private airlines came onto the stage; thereby, Turkish 
Airlines began to lose its grip on a market that it used to dominate totally. Although it has maintained its strong 
position in the Turkish Air Transportation Industry since its inception, Turkish Airlines tried to reposition itself to 
take more advantage of the growing market after the deregulation which accelerated this momentum with various 
players. The competition, the increasing population, increasing income level and strategic position of Turkey 
between east and west played a significant role in this repositioning. 
The first course of action was to establish a new firm called Turkish Air Transportation Inc. (THT) in 1989. The 
main objective for the new company was to perform regional air transportation activities. THT was formed as a 
spin-off of Turkish Airlines. THT could only function four years until 1993. This project failed because of the 
limited number of airports available to the public civil transportation and the failure to provide the necessary 
efficiency in domestic flights in those days. Another factor which led to its failure was the operation of small 
aircrafts with turboprop motors. At that time, Turkish clients were not experienced flyers and these aircrafts 
fomented fear and in turn, made them stay away from flying. Despite the new spin-off’s importance to Turkish 
Airlines, the company was not able to infuse the necessary infrastructural investments to support THT because it 
was state-owned. Although Turkish Airlines recognized early the importance of low-cost carriers in future market, 
the cumbersome structure of the company did not allow easy maneuverability. Strategy was creative but structure 
was not easily transformable accordingly; in other words structure did not follow strategy. Thereafter, Turkish 
Airlines had no choice but concentrating on the traditional way of doing business by increasing the level of service 
quality and by widening its network, both globally and domestically. From this perspective, it concentrated on 
customer orientation.  
Meanwhile, new competitors entered the market by creating new services, hubs, destinations, and solutions with 
disruptive prices. New airlines, new airports, new destinations, and new prices were welcome by the old customers; 
and most importantly new customers joined the market. For instance Pegasus Airlines, established in 1989 as a 
charter airline but renewed after acquired by Esas Holding in 2005, became in a very short period of the second 
largest airlines in Turkey with its hub in the new airport of Istanbul, Sabiha Gökçen. Their motto was “we enable 
people to fly with a fair price” and their position was disruptive since their low price policy did not cause any 
apparent reduction in quality and attracted both old and new clients. Other Turkish brands were also established and 
some performed quite well. Meanwhile Turkish Airlines followed a response strategy of both concentrating on the 
traditional business and ignoring the disruptions. Then in 2008, they changed this approach and decided to 
implement a strategy of opening a new strategic unit with a different brand name and position while keeping also the 
traditional way of doing business associated with the company name; which seems to fall into the fifth response 
category of holding two conflicting positions at the same time. Since both in the global and local markets 
opportunities were abundant this strategy would be fruitful. Otherwise, it is difficult and risky to run after dual 
targets. 
As a matter of fact, one of the main reasons for this belated response was due to the fact that Turkish Airlines did 
not anticipate the types of the carriers which would begin operation after 2003. After low cost carriers came onto the 
stage, Turkish air transportation market experienced an evolution. At the time, Turkish Airlines was also taking 
advantage of this phenomenon caused by this unforeseen expansion. As an increasing number of people started to 
show interest in air transportation, high-end customers tilted towards Turkish Airlines. Nevertheless, Turkish 
Airlines which serves as a full network carrier was unable to reach every segment of the population with this 
business model. In addition, the company was unaware of customer preferences and realized this after the growth of 
LCCs in Turkey, therefore, the response to this transformation was too late in coming. Finally, this delayed response 
could be attributed to false sense of security owing to the fact that Turkish Airlines was a national carrier. In line 
with this business model, Turkish Airlines has always believed that regardless of profitability it has to provide flight 
to all destinations.  
After a period of wait and see, in 2008, Turkish Airlines decided on the formation of a new sub-brand (not a spin 
off this time) called Anadolu Jet that would concentrate on the local Anatolian market destinations from its hub in 
Ankara –located at the center of Anatolia. Connections from Ankara to the other Anatolian airports provided an 
economically efficient network. The new structure was formed as a low cost model which simplified operation by 
removing food and beverage service as well as eliminating cabin selection.  The main goal was to introduce this 
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mood of travel to a wider swath of the population in Turkey and to make flying an essential part of Anatolian people 
by setting up new destinations and renewing old destinations with lower frequency.  As for Turkish Airlines, it had 
positioned itself –with the same brand name with the company name- towards enlarging its market share in the 
global market, since its headquarter and main branches were already established in Istanbul which is at the 
crossroads of international flights. It also ceded to some extend its clients in Anatolian destinations to Anadolu Jet 
and also provided the latter with new clients in the form of transit passengers of international flights. Therefore the 
strategic targets of both strategic business units were different but not at the expense of the other, which produced a 
synergy between the two seemingly opposing but actually complementary positions. 
 
Table 1. The evolution strategic moves of Turkish Airlines to respond Disruptive Innovators 
 
 Pre-deregulation First Deregulation in 1983 Second Deregulation in 2003 
  Before 1983 1983 - 2003 2003 - present 
Market Conditions: 
Deregulations and 
Disruptions 
The only airline was Turkish 
Airlines as a “State Economic 
Enterprise”.  
- Turkish Airlines as a State 
Economic Enterprise was holding 
the dominant position in the 
market.         
- Some low-cost carriers were 
founded but not active in the 
market. 
- 49, 12 % share of Turkish 
Airlines belongs to Republic of 
Turkey Prime Ministry 
Privatization Administration; the 
rest got opened to public.               
-  Low-cost airlines have started to 
capture the market. 
Response Strategy by 
Turkish Airlines 
Concentrating on the old 
position 
Pioneering for a new position Holding two positions at the same 
time: concentrating and disrupting 
the disrupter  
New Action by Turkish 
Airlines 
No action  Spin-off company - THT Inc. Sub-brand - Anadolu Jet 
 
This response may seem to hold two conflicting positions at the same time from a general perspective, but when 
we just examine the competitive moves of the new strategic business unit it may be assumed also as falling also into 
the third category of responding i.e. disrupting the disruptor, since Anadolu Jet did not adopt the disruption as is. It 
did not operate in exactly the same manner with the other low cost carriers. For instance, as depicted on Table 2. 
Ankara was chosen as the hub and a new model of destinations was designed to connect Ankara with other 
Anatolian cities. In addition, a flight structure was formed in order to capture the passengers in transit and guide 
them through proper channels be it international or domestic destinations. Following the motto of the second biggest 
airlines in Turkey, Pegasus Airlines, “we enable people to fly with a fair price”, Anadolu Jet responded with a bit 
different campaign “everybody will fly”. In line with this slogan one of the main aim of the company is to overcome 
the Anatolian people’s resistance to flying. Respectively, the new company has begun to offer some value added 
services in order to facilitate this goal. Thus we can talk about a new category of responding the disruption: an 
ambidextrous approach: holding two complementary positions. In the first position, the responding company 
concentrates on the traditional but still growing market and tries to improve the traditional way of doing business in 
a market where firm resources, capabilities and advantages fit external opportunities. In the second position, by 
establishing a new brand -probably exclusive to another market, the responding company tries to disrupt the 
disruptive innovators with creative solutions after learning from their successful moves or failed trials. We do not 
emphasize the notion of ambidexterity in order to highlight the importance of structural departmentalization or 
geographical segmentation to manage successfully the duality problem in holding two different positions; but we do 
this in order to mention the difficulty but also value of crafting creative strategies to explore and exploit new and 
combined positions instead of fighting desperately for already defined or even occupied positions.  
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4.3. Current Status of Anadolu Jet 
Anadolu Jet rapidly penetrated the Turkish Air Transportation market which amounted to 7.7 million passengers 
domestically by 2013. After Anadolu Jet brand was created, Turkish Airlines positioned itself as a global player and 
thereby targeted high-end customers in Turkey. The company shifted its focus to international operations and 
became an integral part in transit carrier between Europe and Asia (Ishutkina 2009). Turkish Airlines chose to grow 
the pie in the local market instead of engaging in tough competition for market share with other brands. In parallel 
with this strategy Anadolu Jet tried to disrupt the low cost carriers by responding them not only with lower prices 
but also with a new hub and new destinations. Moreover, Turkish Airlines willingly surrendered a part of its 
business to Anadolu Jet. Both companies try to give the impression to their customer that they are under the same 
roof whether they fly with Turkish Airlines or Anadolu Jet. Furthermore, whereas Turkish Airlines has to emphasize 
the attributes in accordance with its full service policy, Anadolu Jet provides the passengers with freedom of choice 
in terms of services offered with additional charge. The changes in passenger numbers and ratios of Anadolu Jet 
between 2008 – 2013 are given in the following tables below. As it is seen in Table 2. passenger number growth rate 
was very rapid in the first years of its market entry. Tables 3. and 4 show that market share increased continuously 
in both total domestic market and also within the total sales of Turkish Airlines except in 2012. 
 
Table 2. Annual growth of Anadolu Jet 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Domestic Passenger Number  1,716 2,812 4,705 5,300 5,317 7,697 
Domestic Passenger Growth Rate   64% 67% 13% 0.3% 45% 
 
Table 3. The percentage of Anadolu Jet passengers in total domestic passengers of Turkish Airlines 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Anadolu Jet  16% 24% 34% 37% 33% 38% 
 
Table 4. Turkish domestic market shares by airlines 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Turkish Airlines 55% 50% 38% 34% 33% 33% 
Pegasus Airlines 14% 17% 20% 23% 26% 27% 
Anadolu Jet 11% 16% 19% 20% 16% 20% 
Other Airlines 20% 17% 23% 23% 25% 20% 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study’s aim was to investigate the factors that affect the decision-making process of an established industry 
leader regarding a response to disruptive innovations. A study of Turkish Airlines can be regarded as a considerable 
example of how disruptive innovation in the form of low cost carriers has had powerful effects in the transformation 
of its business. Low cost carrier model is considered one of the most illustrative example of disruptive phenomenon 
due to the changing face of competition. LCCs serve as different value proposition than full service carriers and 
attract many existing passengers while creating new demand for air travel. Low-cost carriers have transformed the 
air transportation market and have helped stimulate domestic passenger growth in Turkey ever since the 
deregulation. In particular, growing consumer demand and reduced ticket prices provided by low-cost carriers have 
enabled rapid growth of the domestic air transportation industry. Consequently, the largest share of traffic has been 
carried by low-cost carriers.  
The literature supports that low-end disruption encourages the other companies to take immediate action 
(Christensen & Raynor 2003). Despite the fact that Turkish Airlines had recognized the threat posed by low cost 
carriers at an early point after the deregulation of Turkish air transportation market, it encountered some difficulties 
805 Evrim Gemici and Lutfi hak Alpkan /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  207 ( 2015 )  797 – 806 
in responding since it held the leading position in the market. Resource dependence theory seems to provide another 
explanation for why such a response was late. This theory explains that organizations need critical alternative 
resources in order to survive. Customers and investors have the power to control as to how and where resources 
should be allocated in innovation (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). Customers and investors always direct companies to 
investments that satisfy their own needs. Therefore, it is very difficult to invest in technologies which meet 
tomorrow’s needs today. On the other hand, moving the market down is in contradiction with this perspective. The 
biggest failure of large companies is the conviction that small markets are not able to meet the companies growing 
needs.  
Later on, Turkish Airlines decided to get involved in a new business model by attempting to manage two 
conflicting positions. Christensen & Raynor (2003) suggest that establishing a spin-off is necessary when revenue 
and cost structure of the mainstream organization is different from that of the new one. Nevertheless, although the 
previous attempt by Turkish Airlines was to establish a spin-off company, Anadolu Jet has been operating under 
Turkish Airlines Inc. however as an independent division. The consequences of this decision would be felt in the 
future. The factors which led Turkish Airlines to respond to disruptive innovation could be divided into two 
categories; disruptive threat in the Turkish market and macro-economic factors which would make a new business 
model investment attractive in Turkey. Macro-economic factors which drove Turkish Airlines to this decision were 
the growth capacity of Turkish air transportation market, population growth and an increase in the income level. On 
the other hand, the appearance and performance of LCCs and their increasing market share prompted Turkish 
Airlines to take action. Respectively, Turkish Airlines set up a sub-brand and triggered the demand by spreading its 
wings to Anatolia with its low-cost carrier. Turkish Airlines has begun to pursue an expansion strategy as a transit 
carrier between Europe and Asia and has decided to dominate the domestic market with Anadolu Jet.  
One of the expectations of disruptive innovation theory is that the attributes of lower performance products or 
services will improve. With regards to the other LCCs which operate in Turkish Air Transportation market, many of 
them try to improve their standards of quality and thereby, target the market as a whole. Therefore, the impact of 
that lower performance attributes of disruptive products or services will improve and will in turn, intersect with the 
needs of the mainstream customer base will hold true. Although the state partnership structure of Turkish Airlines 
was considered to be a disadvantage at first, Turkish Airlines succeeded to respond to the disruptive innovation, 
effectively with its low-cost strategy. Having been established in 2008, Anadolu Jet seems to have proved itself 
through the strategy growing the pie in Turkish Air Transportation market. As a matter of course, the strong brand 
name of Turkish Airlines is one of the greatest assets of Anadolu Jet.  
Our findings may produce some managerial and theoretical implications and further research suggestions. 
Reaction time and response strategy towards the disruption may vary according to the internal and external factors 
of the established leaders of the market. Strategic decision makers should consider all the relevant factors and react 
by flexible strategic plans. Learning from the earlier moves of both disruptors and the other competitors is critical. 
Ambidexterity is also be taken into consideration when seemingly contradictory alternatives are both advantageous 
for the response. Then instead of selecting one of the already tried option by our company or by the disruptors, 
balancing and combining may be a creative option.  By the theoretical lenses this approach may be labeled as a fifth 
type of response for disruption as an ambidextrous one: “holding two positions which are seemingly opposing but if 
managed successfully complementing”.  As for the research suggestions internal and external factors that lead 
strategic decision makers to select and implement different types of response strategies can be investigated trough 
empirical studies.  
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